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On April 8, 1997, the Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange began trading a new futures contract
for the Basic Formula Price (BFP).  The contract is unusual in several respects:  
• It is a cash settlement contract.  A physical commodity is not "delivered."  Rather,
contracts outstanding at expiration are settled by payments and receipts representing
the difference between the contract price and the reported BFP value.
• The contract does not represent an actual commodity.  The BFP is a reference price for
raw milk, not a price actually experienced in a cash marketplace.
• The BFP is not a constantly evolving price.  It is announced after the fact once a month
and becomes the basis for paying for milk already delivered.
• The BFP is used in establishing minimum milk prices throughout the country.  Most
futures commodity prices are specific to a particular location, and cash prices in other
locations differ by varying amounts depending on local market conditions.  In contrast,
the BFP expressly sets minimum prices in all federal milk marketing order markets,
regardless of location.
This unique new contract offers excellent hedging opportunities for buyers and sellers of raw
milk.  Since federal milk marketing order pricing formulas directly incorporate the BFP,  cash market
participants can accurately relate their prices to the BFP contract price.  Minimal basis risk should
encourage broad hedging interest in the new contract.The designations, Grade A and Grade B, stem from harmonized municipal standards, enforced by
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inspection, pertaining to characteristics of milk production facilities. In addition, Grade A milk has higher minimum
milk quality standards.  
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In what follows, we describe in more detail what the BFP measures, how it is calculated, and
how it is used in milk pricing.  Then, we discuss the characteristics of the new BFP contract,
comparing it to the CSCE Grade A milk contract.  Finally, we illustrate several hedging examples
using the BFP contract.
HOW THE BFP IS CALCULATED AND USED
The BFP measures the value of Grade B milk marketed to plants in Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Grade B milk is produced under less stringent farm-level sanitary requirements than applicable to
Grade A milk.   Grade B milk can only be used to produce specified manufactured products; it cannot
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be used for packaged fluid milk products.  In 1995, only 5 percent of U.S. milk was Grade B, and 37
percent of that total was produced in the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Grade B milk trades in an unregulated marketplace.  Consequently, Grade B milk prices are
viewed in the dairy industry as representing the market value of milk for manufacturing uses.
The BFP is a synthetic price reported monthly by the National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  It is composed of two parts:  The Base Month
Minnesota-Wisconsin (M-W) Price, representing a survey estimate of Grade B pay prices for the
previous month, plus a price adjuster based on changes in manufactured product prices between the
previous month and the current month.  
The Base Month M-W Price is estimated from a survey of approximately 170 manufacturing
milk plants located in Minnesota and Wisconsin.  These plants procure about 80 percent of all Grade
B milk marketed in the two states.  The Base Month M-W Price is reported by NASS by the fifth of
the month two months after the month to which it applies.  For example, the Base Month M-W Price
for December 1996 was reported on February 5, 1997, and became part of the January 1997 BFP.
The price adjuster is used to update the Base Month M-W Price to the current month.  The
adjustment formula is complex.  Essentially, it calculates the monthly change in gross value per
hundredweight of milk used to produce butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheddar cheese weighted by the
proportion of milk in the two states used to produce these products.  Cheese typically represents more
than 95 percent of the weight in the update formula.The BFP is announced on the fifth of the month if the fifth falls on a normal business day.  Otherwise, it
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is announced on the last business day preceding the fifth.  For example, the December 1996 BFP was announced on
Friday, January 3, 1997, since January 5 fell on a Sunday.
The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (Farm Bill) mandates consolidation of orders
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to no more than 14 and no less than 10 by early 1999.
Class IIIa, a subcategory of Class III, represents milk used to produce nonfat dry milk.  Class IIIa prices
5
are set using a formula based on nonfat dry milk prices and yields; they are NOT tied to the BFP.
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The BFP, reported on or before the fifth of the following month , is the sum of the Base Month
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M-W Price and the change in gross value adjuster.  In effect, it measures what Grade B plants actually
paid one month earlier adjusted for their ability to pay based on changes in product prices between
the previous and current months.
An illustration of the BFP calculation may be useful.  The December 1996 BFP was reported
at $11.34 per hundredweight.  This was the November 1996 base month M-W price of $12.19 per
hundredweight plus the change in product value during December of minus $0.85 per hundredweight.
The change in product value was calculated by weighting the changes in butter/nonfat dry milk gross
value per hundredweight (minus $0.5708) and cheese gross value per hundredweight (minus $0.8570)
by the relative proportions of Minnesota and Wisconsin milk used for butter/nonfat dry milk (0.8
percent) and cheese (99.2 percent) in Minnesota and Wisconsin in October 1996.
While the BFP represents a general indicator of the value of milk used in manufacturing, its
importance is magnified because of its use in Federal Milk Marketing Orders as a price base.  Federal
orders establish minimum prices for Grade A milk in 32 designated marketing areas of the U.S.
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About 75 percent of Grade A milk and 70 percent of all milk produced in the U.S. is subject to federal
order regulation.  The primary unregulated area is the state of California, which maintains its own
system for setting minimum milk prices.
Federal orders establish three milk use classes with different minimum prices.  Class I, which
commands the highest value, refers to milk used for packaged fluid milk products.  Class II is milk
used to make perishable, or "soft" manufactured products like yogurt, cottage cheese, and ice cream.
Class III milk is used for semi-perishable, "hard" manufactured products, primarily butter, nonfat dry
milk, and hard cheeses.
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Minimum class prices, announced monthly, are tied directly to the Basic Formula Price.  The
current month Class III price is the BFP for the current month, and is the same in all orders.  The Class
II price, also common across orders, is the BFP from two months' earlier plus 30 cents per
hundredweight.  Class I prices are set by adding a Class I differential to the BFP from two months'
earlier.  Class I differentials are different across orders, but are the same from month-to-month within
orders.4
The direct link between federal order class prices and the BFP means that minimum processor
pay prices are known with certainty when the BFP is announced.  Actual pay prices are negotiated and
are generally higher than the announced minimum prices.  In particular, most Class I milk is sold by
dairy cooperatives to proprietary fluid milk processors.  Cooperatives typically negotiate a premium
over the federal order minimum price.  But since over-order premiums tend to be fairly constant over
time, Class I prices are correspondingly predictable once the BFP is announced.  Similarly, the
amounts by which actual Class II and Class III prices differ from order-mandated minimum prices do
not vary much from month-to-month.  Buyers can accurately link their milk cost to the BFP.
Federal orders also specify minimum producer pay prices, or blend prices.  These are weighted
average values based on the proportion of producer milk used in the various classes.  Actual producer
pay prices differ significantly from the order blend prices for several reasons.  The announced blend
price is for "standardized" milk composition at a specific location; differences in milk composition
and location among producers lead to different minimum prices.  Many plants have extra-order
payment schedules for milk quality, volume, or other milk characteristics.  Hence, actual pay prices
will deviate from minimum blend prices.  Dairy cooperatives are exempt from paying minimum order
pay prices, and sometimes "reblend" total receipts across markets and uses, resulting in further
variations in producer pay prices from order blend prices.  
Despite these differences between actual and announced minimum blend prices, factors
underlying the differences are predictable.  For example, dairy farmers know their milk composition
and their buyer's premium schedules, and they can use historical data to accurately predict milk
utilization in their federal order market.  Hence, they can reliably link their expected pay price to the
BFP.
Table 1 illustrates the close relationship of various milk price measures with the BFP over the
period 1984-1995.  The four comparison monthly series (all adjusted to 3.5 percent butterfat content)
are:  
(1)  Wisconsin Grade A manufacturing price.  This is an estimate of the fob plant cost of
Grade A milk used for manufacturing purposes in Wisconsin.  It is reported by the
Upper Midwest Federal Milk Marketing Order Administrator's office and is derived
by adjusting actual pay prices for revenues associated with federal order Class I and
Class II sales.
(2) Wisconsin Grade A price.  This is a USDA estimate of the state-wide average fob plant
pay price for Grade A milk in Wisconsin.
(3) California Class 4b.  This is the minimum price for Grade A milk used for making
cheese announced under the California milk pricing program.5
(4)  10 X Block Cheese.  This series is derived by multiplying the monthly average block
cheddar cheese price from the National Cheese Exchange by 10.0.  It approximates the
gross value of cheese from 100 pounds of milk at 3.5 percent butterfat test.
Table 1 indicates that, compared to the actual prices, the variation in basis (difference between
the price and the BFP) is only 1/4 to 1/3 as large.  In other words, while the prices that plants pay and
farmers receive for milk are different from the BFP, the pay prices move very closely with the BFP,
i.e., the price differences are quite predictable.  This has important implications for hedging.   
Basis is even more predictable than indicated by the raw price differences.  While the BFP is
adjusted to a standard butterfat test (3.5 percent), it is not adjusted to a common protein test.  Protein
content, which positively affects cheese yields, varies seasonally.  When protein tests are relatively
high, cheesemakers can achieve higher yields per hundredweight of milk, meaning that the BFP at 3.5
percent butterfat will be relatively high compared to when protein tests are lower.  Factoring in the
predictable nature of milk protein content can reduce basis risk.
The price series with the largest variance relative to the BFP is the California 4b price.  This
price is not directly linked to the BFP.  Rather, it is related through a formula to the National Cheese
Exchange price "opinion" for block cheddar cheese.  Nevertheless, variation in the 4b price basis is
substantially less than the actual price variation.
Table 1:  Milk Prices and Price Differences Relative to BFP, 1984-95
Price Measure Mean Deviation Variation Min. Max.
Standard Coef. of
Actual Prices, Dollars per Hundredweight
M-W/BFP* 11.70 .87 .07 10.02 14.93
Wis. Grade A Mfg. 12.38 1.00 .08 10.58 15.97
Wis. Grade A - All 12.57 .96 .08 10.77 15.99
California 4b 10.95 .85 .08 9.29 13.30
10 X NCE Block Cheese 12.76 .94 .07 10.87 15.45Price Measure Mean Deviation Variation Min. Max.
Standard Coef. of
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Actual Prices Minus BFP, Dollars per Hundredweight
Wis. Grade A Mfg. .67 .22 .32 .31 1.16
Wis. Grade A - All .87 .23 .26 .46 1.48
California 4b -.76 .36 .48 -2.06 -.05
10 X NCE Block Cheese 1.05 .30 .29 .41 1.96
*Basic Formula Price (BFP) beginning May 1995.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW BFP FUTURES CONTRACT
The new Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange BFP futures contract calls for cash settlement of
a value equal to 1,000 times the announced BFP.  The trading unit is not a physical volume of a
commodity.  Rather, the holders of long and short positions at the date of "delivery" agree to settle
their account at the announced BFP value.  Other characteristics of the new BFP contract are similar
to the Exchange's Grade A milk contract.  Specifics of both contracts are shown in Table 2.
Table 2.  Contract Specifications:  CSCE Milk Futures Contracts
Contract Specification BFP Grade A Milk
Commodity Basic Formula Price at 3.5 FOB delivery of Grade A milk
percent butterfat content as with 3.5 percent butterfat
reported by USDA content from an approved plant 
Trading unit 1,000 times the BFP One tanker load 
Delivery Unit Equivalent to 100,000 pounds One tanker load; allowable
of milk (1,000 hundredweight) variation 48,000 to 50,000
pounds
Trading hours 9:15 AM to 2:00 PM NY time Same
Delivery Months Feb., Apr., Jun., Aug., Oct., Same
Dec.  Intervening months may
be offered
Price Quotation Dollars and cents per Same
hundredweightContract Specification BFP Grade A Milk
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Minimum Fluctuation $.01 per cwt., equivalent to $.01 per cwt., equivalent to
$10.00 per contract $5.00 per contract
Daily Price limits From previous day's settlement Same
price, $.50 per cwt. with
variable limits effective under
certain conditions; no price
limits on 2 nearby months
Position Limits 1,000 contracts (futures plus Same
options); 250 contracts in last
trading month
Standards Not Applicable Grade A raw milk with 3.5%
butterfat content
Delivery points Not Applicable From Interstate Milk Shippers
(IMS) certified plants,
receiving stations or transfer
stations located in the Madison
district of Chicago federal
order
Delivery  Cash Settlement Pick up by the buyer from the
seller's plant
Last trading day Exchange business day prior to Six Exchange business days
USDA announcement of the prior to the last Exchange
BFP (usually the fifth of the business day of the delivery
following month) month 
Notice of delivery  Not Applicable First exchange business day
following last trading day
First and last  Settlement on day USDA First Exchange day following
delivery day announces the BFP notice day up to the last
Exchange business day of the
delivery month      Actually, trading account debits and credits occur daily, as futures positions are "marked to market" each trading
6
day.  Accordingly, the total credit (debit) would accrue over time between the initial sale (purchase) and the
settlement date.
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Cash settlement, rather than physical delivery, is the major difference between the two milk
contracts.  Cash settlement works as follows:  The BFP announced by USDA on the fifth of the month
is the final settlement price.  Traders who hold BFP contracts at the close of the last trading day will
make or receive a total payment equal to the difference between the price they purchased or sold the
contract for and the announced BFP.  For example, suppose that in January 1997, a trader sold an
April 1997 BFP contract at $13.50 and holds the contract until the settlement date.  The April BFP
is announced on May 5 at $12.50.  The short trader's account is credited a total of $1,000, the price
difference ($1.00 per hundredweight) times the contract volume (1,000).  The account of the trader
on the long side of the contract in this case would be debited a total of $1,000.
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Cash settlement avoids the complications associated with physical delivery; money changes
hands rather than milk.  Traders do not need to be concerned about liquidating their positions prior
to delivery, since their positions will be reconciled against the announced BFP. 
For many dairy industry risk managers, the BFP contract is superior to the Grade A milk
contract as a hedging tool.  The Grade A milk contract was fashioned to price the Basic Formula Price.
However, the terms of delivery have resulted in the contract price reflecting an unpredictable basis
relative to the BFP and other milk prices.  Specifically, the Grade A milk contract calls for delivery
of Grade A milk from specified plants regulated under the Chicago Regional Federal Milk Order, most
of which are cheese manufacturing plants.  During certain times of the year, these plants supply milk
for fluid purposes to handlers in deficit milk production regions.  When that occurs, the plants
typically assess buyers a "give-up" charge, in addition to the federal order minimum price.  Give-up
charges represent the costs of lost manufacturing margins and the cost of operating at reduced capacity
due to the plant diverting milk from manufacturing.
Settlement of the BFP contract will be at the announced BFP for the month.  Hence, some
hedgers can more confidently predict basis.  They can localize prices against the reference price that
is used in setting minimum purchase prices and farm pay prices.  However, hedgers whose source of
milk is Chicago order plants may still find the Grade A contract a superior hedging tool.
POTENTIAL HEDGERS AND HEDGING EXAMPLES
The BFP contract offers risk management opportunities to dairy producers, cooperatives, and
processors through direct hedging or through forward price contracting.  In combination with the
CSCE cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk futures contracts, the BFP contract can also be used to
protect manufacturing margins.  9
In what follows, we illustrate possible uses of the BFP contract as a risk management tool.
In each example, we assume that the hedged position is held until expiration of the contract (the
settlement date, i.e., the day the BFP is announced).  Consequently, the futures market gain or loss is
based on the contract price at the time the hedge is placed compared to the actual BFP.  This
assumption eliminates any basis risk from non-convergence.  Of course, there are circumstances when
it would be economically advantageous to liquidate a futures position prior to expiration.
DAIRY FARMER HEDGE
Dairy farmers can hedge milk sales using the cheddar cheese or the nonfat dry milk contracts.
But hedges based on these contracts are cross-hedges, requiring the conversion of cheese or nonfat dry
milk prices to equivalent milk prices.  Hedging Grade A milk at the farm against the BFP futures
contract is a direct hedge, which makes it simpler to calculate basis, particularly if payment is made
on a volume basis.  The Grade A milk contract would also be a direct hedge for a Grade A producer.
But for reasons noted above, the BFP contract would usually involve smaller basis risk.
A simplified dairy farmer hedge is illustrated below, in which a dairy farmer sells an April BFP
contract to hedge expected April Grade A milk production of 100,000 pounds.  Given specific on-farm
conditions with respect to milk composition, size of herd, milk quality, etc.;  buyer conditions with
respect to the buyer's premium structure (plant volume, quality, protein, etc.); and milk utilization by
class in the federal order market; the farmer has determined that a $13.00 BFP correlates to a Grade
A milk price of $14.00.  That price looks favorable compared to production costs, so the farmer
attempts to lock the price in through a short hedge.  In Case I, with a constant basis, the lower cash
market price from a lower BFP is offset by futures market gains.  In cases II and III, offsets are not
exact because the basis at the time the hedge was lifted was different from what was expected at the
time the hedge was placed.  Net gains are experienced with a strengthened basis and losses are
incurred when the basis weakens.
The farm-level Grade A price associated with a particular BFP was merely specified in this
example.  In reality, considerable analysis would be necessary to derive the basis and there would be
several sources of basis risk.  The minimum federal order blend price varies with utilization by class
as well as with the BFP; hence the blend price relative to the BFP is not constant.  A plant's base pay
price relative to the federal order blend price varies with product mix, extent of competition, and
premium structure.  Farmers' butterfat and protein tests, somatic cell count and other quality variables,
herd size, and a host of other factors cause actual pay prices to deviate from base pay prices.
Another complicating factor in calculating basis for dairy farmer hedges is Multiple
Component Pricing (MCP), which is used in many milk marketing orders.  Under MCP,
manufacturing plants are obligated to pay for the pounds of milk components they purchase rather than
the hundredweights of milk containing the components.  Typically, priced components are butterfat,
protein and other solids.10
With MCP, dairy farmers would need to convert the expected value of milk components to an
equivalent per hundredweight price.  Similarly, plants paying on an MCP basis would need to relate
component prices to an aggregate per hundredweight basis in calculating basis.  Since the BFP is used
to derive component prices, this conversion is reasonably straightforward.
Dairy Farmer Hedge
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '97 Dairy farmer expects to sell SELL  Apr. BFP contract $1.00
100,000 pounds of Grade A milk in @ $13.00
April.  Price expectation based on
April futures price is $14.00
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
Apr. '97 Sell 100,000 pounds of milk @ Apr. BFP announced @ $1.00
Gain/(Loss) ($1.00) $1.00
Net Gain  $0.00
$13.00. $12.00.  Cash settle at
announced price
Case II:  Futures price decline/Basis weakens
Apr. '97 Sell 100,000 pounds of milk @ Apr.BFP announced @ $.50
Gain/(Loss) ($1.00) $.50
Net Gain ($0.50)
$13.00. $12.50.  Cash settle at
announced price
Case III:  Futures price increase/Basis strengthens
Apr. '97 Sell 100,000 pounds of milk @ Apr. BFP announced @ $1.50
Gain/(Loss) $1.00 ($.50)
Net Gain $.50
$15.00. $13.50.  Cash settle at
announced price11
CASH FORWARD PRICING
Milk futures can be used by dairy plants to offer fixed price contracts to their dairy farmer
suppliers.  The cheddar cheese contract on the CSCE has been used for this purpose by cooperatives
heavily involved in manufacturing cheese.  The new BFP futures may provide superior hedging
opportunities for plants making other dairy products.  Some cheese plants might also choose to use
the new BFP futures rather than the cheese futures for hedging cash forward contracts.
A simple example of cash forward contracting by a cheese plant using BFP futures is
illustrated below.  The example is simple because it implies a very rudimentary basis calculation.
Cash market gains and losses are calculated relative to "opportunity cost," i.e., in relation to what
competitors paid for milk.
Cheese plant offers cash forward price contract to dairy farmers
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '97 Plant offers fixed price contract to SELL Apr. BFP $1.00
Grade A patrons.   Will pay $14.00 contracts @ $13.00.
base price (3.5% butterfat) for April
milk.  Contract price is derived as
follows:
  $13.00 BFP
+    .75 Normal Apr.  "pool draw"
+    .25 Plant premium
  $14.00
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
Apr. '97 Plant pays producers the contract price Apr. BFP announced $1.00
Gain/(Loss)  $0.00
Net Gain
of $14.00.  Competitors pay $13.00. @ $12.00.  Cash settles
($1.00) $1.00
at announced priceDate Cash Market Futures Market Basis
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Case II:  Futures price increase/No basis change
Apr. '96 Plant pays producers the contract price Apr. BFP announced $1.00
Gain/(Loss) $0.00
Net Gain
of $14.00.  Competitors pay $15.00. @ $14.00.  Cash settles
$1.00 ($1.00)
at announced price
The plant offering the forward pricing arrangement establishes its future pay price according
to the futures market price for milk.  In this case, the April price offer is set in January by adding the
manufacturing plant's expected "pool draw" and its plant premium to the futures market prediction of
the BFP.  The pool draw is the difference between the reported federal order blend price for the month
and the Class III, or Basic Formula Price.  Pooled manufacturing plants receive this draw to make up
the difference between the blend price (which all regulated handlers are obligated to pay their
producers) and the Class III price (the order-specified value of milk used to make cheese).  As
described earlier, the plant premium is over the blend price, and reflects competition among plants for
milk.
The pool draw and the plant premium comprise the basis, which is added to the futures price
to derive the Grade A price offer.  The plant is committed to paying $14.00 per hundredweight.  To
protect itself against adverse price movements, which would prevent the plant from paying the fixed
price, the plant hedges by selling April BFP futures contracts equivalent in volume to the volume of
milk contracted at the fixed price.
If there is no change in the basis from what was predicted when the hedge was placed, then
futures market gains will offset cash market losses if futures market prices fall.  Cash market losses,
in this case, are relative to what competitors paid for milk.  In case I of the example, the plant offering
the forward contract would be at a serious competitive disadvantage if it were obligated to pay $14.00
while its competitors making the same product could acquire milk at $13.00.
In case II, the plant loses $1.00 per hundredweight from its futures market transaction because
the announced BFP was $1.00 higher than the BFP contract at the time the hedge was placed.
However, this loss is offset by the lower price the plant pays for contracted milk relative to
competitors.  Obviously, those dairy farmers holding fixed price contracts would not be very pleased
by this turn of events.  But they received the price they agreed to contract for in January.
FLUID MILK PROCESSOR HEDGING      A fluid milk processor could also employ the Grade A milk contract to hedge its raw milk purchase.  But unless
7
the processor was acquiring milk from supply plants designated as delivery sources in the Grade A contract, basis
risk would likely be less using the BFP contract.
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Possibly the most direct hedging opportunity with the BFP contract is for a fluid milk bottling
plant that purchases its entire raw milk supply from a cooperative under an open price contract.  This
is because all MCP plans in effect under federal milk marketing orders exempt fluid handlers (bottlers)
from MCP payments.  In all orders, fluid handlers' pool obligation is the order Class I price plus or
minus an adjustment for butterfat content above or below 3.5 percent.  The minimum Class I price is
the basic formula price from two months earlier plus a fixed Class I differential.  Hence, a handler can
lock in its minimum federal order price two months beyond the contract month for the BFP futures
contract.
7
Fluid handlers acquiring milk from cooperatives typically pay more than the order minimum
Class I price in the form of an "over-order" or "superpool" premium added to the announced Class I
price.  These premiums are a source of basis risk, but they are usually announced at least two months
in advance, and usually do not change substantially from month-to-month.
An example of a potential hedge by a fluid milk bottler is illustrated in the table below.  The
example assumes that the bottler forward contracts for delivery of half-pints of milk to a school district
on a fixed price basis.  The bottler's largest cost is raw milk, so it wants to protect its contracted price
by locking in its raw milk cost, which is tied directly to the BFP.
Fluid Milk Processor Hedge to protect a contracted sale.
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '97 Bottler needs 500,000 pounds of BUY 5 Feb. BFP contracts $3.50
milk to supply April school milk @ $11.50
contract.
Class I Differential = $2.50.
Coop premium = $1.00.
Price objective is $15.00.Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
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Case I:  Futures price increase/No basis change
Mar. 5, '97 Feb. BFP announced @
Apr. '97 Bottler purchases 500,000 pounds $3.50
Gain/(Loss) ($1.00) $1.00
Net Gain  $0.00
of milk from coop @ $16.00 (Feb.
BFP + Class I Differential [$2.50]
+ Coop premium [$1.00])
$12.50.  Cash settles at
announced price
Case II:  Futures price increase/Basis strengthens
Mar. 5, '97 Feb. BFP announced @
Apr. '96 Bottler purchases 500,000 pounds $4.00
Gain/(Loss) ($0.50) $1.50
Net Gain
of milk from coop @ $17.00 (Feb.
BFP + Class I Differential [$2.50]
+ Coop premium [$1.50]).
($2.00)
$13.00.  Cash settles at
announced price
Case III:  Futures price decrease/Basis weakens
Mar. 5, '97 Feb. BFP announced @
Apr. '96 Bottler purchases 500,000 pounds $3.25
Gain/(Loss) $.25 ($.50)
Net Gain
of milk from coop @ $14.25  (Feb.
BFP + Class I Differential [$2.50]
+ Coop premium [$.75]). 
$.75
$11.00.  Cash settles at
announced priceThe basis is said to strengthen when the cash price increases relative the futures price.  The basis "weakens"
6
when the cash price decreases relative to the futures price.  Longs have a net loss when the basis strengthens and a
net gain when the basis weakens.  The opposite occurs for shorts. 
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In this example, the bottler would have established its contract price to the school district by
converting the February 1997 futures price into a related raw product price that would have permitted
a normal profit.  With no change in the basis (the difference between the bottler's expected
procurement price and the futures contract price), any potential loss from a price increase in the cash
market would be offset by a gain from futures market transactions.  
Because of the lag in Class I pricing under federal orders, the bottler would place its hedge in
the futures contract delivery month two months before the milk was to be purchased. Since
cooperatives price milk to their buyers according to federal order pricing rules, the lagged BFP, not
the current month BFP, establishes the processors fluid milk price.
Since the futures contract is held until the delivery date and settled in cash at the announced
BFP, there is only one source of basis risk in this example:  The coop overorder premium may be
different from what the plant expected when it placed its hedge.  The other component of basis, the
federal order Class I differential, is known at the time the hedge is placed.
In this example, when the basis strengthened (the co-op premium increased) there was a net
loss because the loss on the cash market exceeded the gain on the futures market. When the basis
weakened (the co-op premium decreased), there was a net gain because the gain on the cash market
exceeded the loss on the futures market.
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FLUID MILK SUPPLIER HEDGING
Another fluid milk hedging opportunity involves a cooperative supplying milk to a fluid
bottler.  The hedge would be different depending on whether the supply contract was an open price
or fixed price contract.  With an open price contract, the cooperative would be interested in locking
in a price that represented a profitable fluid milk price for its members.  It would place a short hedge
to protect against a price decline.  Under a fixed price contract, the cooperative would need to protect
its procurement cost, and would place a long hedge.
Looking first at the open price supply contract hedge, assume that in January 1997, a
cooperative agrees to supply one million pounds of milk to a fluid bottler in June.  The price when the
milk is delivered will be the BFP for April plus $3.75 per hundredweight.  Assume that the Class I
differential applying in this market is $2.50 per hundredweight, and that the cooperative is a member
of a over-order bargaining federation that has announced a $1.25 per hundredweight Class I premium
on all June fluid milk sales in the marketing area.  Under these assumptions, the basis for the hedging
transaction is $3.75, the sum of the order Class I differential and the overorder premium.16
The cooperative feels that the $13.00 BFP futures price for April 1997 represents an optimistic
price level, and decides to lock in the related fluid milk price of $16.75.  To do so, it sells BFP
contracts equal in volume to its contracted cash market sale, or 10 contracts.  Because of the lag in
pricing Federal order Class I milk, the cooperative will place its hedge in the BFP futures contract
month that is two months prior to the month it will make its milk delivery; it is hedging in the month
when the sale is priced.
In this example, futures market gains exactly offset cash market losses (relative to the price
expectation) if the April 1997 BFP (announced on May 5) is less than the BFP futures price at the time
the hedge is placed.  Likewise, cash market gains (relative to expectations) offset futures market losses
if the actual BFP ends up higher than the April BFP contract price in January.  This is an unusual, risk-
free hedge.  There is no basis risk because the cooperative has locked its sales price to the BFP
through the known Class I differential and the known overorder premium.  
Cooperative contracts to supply milk to a fluid bottler at future date
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '97 Cooperative signs an open price SELL 10 Apr. BFP $3.75
contract to supply a fluid bottler contracts @ $13.00.
with 1 million pounds of milk
during June 1996.  Price at
delivery will be BFP from two
months earlier plus $3.75 (Class I
differential of $2.50 and Overorder
premium of $1.25).  Coop wants to
lock in an attractive fluid milk
sales price as reflected by current
futures quote for April.  Price
objective is $16.75.
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
May 5, '97 Apr. BFP announced @
Jun. '97 Cooperative delivers milk to $3.75
Gain/(Loss)  $0.00 $0.25
Net Gain
bottler.  Gross pay price is $16.50
($0.25)
$12.75.  Cash settles at
announced price
Case II:  Futures price increase/No basis changeDate Cash Market Futures Market Basis
17
May 5, '97 Apr. BFP announced @
Jun. '97 Cooperative delivers milk to $3.75
Gain/(Loss)  $0.00 ($1.00)
Net Gain
bottler.  Gross pay price is $17.75.
 $1.00
$14.00.  Cash settles at
announced price
This example ignores one complexity that should be recognized.  Note that nothing is said
about what the cooperative pays its members in the month of June.  The June BFP could be much
lower or higher than the April BFP.  But because of federal order pricing and pooling rules, the
cooperative accounts to the federal order pool for its Class I disposition at the federal order Class I
price, which, for June Class I sales, is set in April.  Consequently, even if the BFP is different between
April and June, the Class I price obligation is fixed in April.  The cost of the milk in terms of the
cooperative pay price may be different from expectations because producer premiums may be higher
or lower than predicted.  But this risk applies whether or not the cooperative hedges; hence, it is not
a part of basis risk in this example.
A second example illustrates a fixed price contractual arrangement.  In January 1997, a
cooperative agrees to supply milk to a bottler in June 1997 at $16.00 per hundredweight.  To protect
itself against adverse price movements that would cause a loss, the cooperative wants to lock in the
cost of the milk it will supply at the fixed price through a long hedge.
In this example, the basis is calculated as the cost of milk to the cooperative less the BFP.  In
practice, the cooperative would set its sales price by adding its expected basis to the futures market
prediction of the BFP for the pricing month.  The cost of milk is largely fixed by federal order pricing
and pooling rules.  However, there is an element of basis risk associated with "plant premiums"
(premiums over the federal order blend price).  In building its basis, the cooperative assumes it will
pay a Grade A plant premium of $1.00 per hundredweight.  In Case II, the actual premium paid was
only $.75, leading to a hedging "profit" equal to the amount by which the basis weakened ($.25).  Had
the basis strengthened, the hedge would have yielded a loss equal to the change.18
Cooperative contracts to supply milk to a fluid bottler at a specified price in the future
Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
Jan. '97 Cooperative commits to provide 1 BUY 10 Apr. BFP $2.50
million pounds of milk to a fluid bottler contracts @ $12.00.
during June 1996 at a fixed price of
$16.00.
Class I Differential = $1.50.
Grade A premium to patrons is $1.00
over the order blend price.  Projected
cost of milk is $14.50. (BFP plus
$2.50)
Case I:  Futures price decline/No basis change
May 5, '97 Apr. BFP announced
Jun. '97 Cooperative procures milk to meet $2.50
Gain/(Loss) $0.25
Net Gain $0.00
contract.  Accounts to federal order
pool at $13.25 Class I price ($11.75
BFP plus $1.50 Class I differential). 
Pays producers a June '96 plant
premium of $1.00 (over the order blend
price).  Cost of milk is $14.25.
@ $11.75.  Cash settles
at announced price
($0.25)Date Cash Market Futures Market Basis
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Case II:  Futures price increase/Basis Weakens
May 5, '97 Apr. BFP announced
Jun. '97 Cooperative procures milk to meet $2.25
Gain/(Loss) ($.75)
Net Gain  $.25 
contract.  Accounts to federal order
pool at $14.50 Class I price ($13.00
BFP plus $1.50 Class I differential). 
Pays producers a June '96 plant
premium of $.75 (over the order blend
price).  Cost of milk is $15.25.
@ $13.00.  Cash settles
at announced price
$1.00
CHEESE PLANT HEDGES OPERATING MARGIN
A cheese plant could use the BFP contract to protect plant operating margins.  Assume a
cheese plant in January 1997 contracts to deliver 50,000 pounds of cheddar cheese to a cheese buyer
during April at a fixed price.  The risk to the cheese plants is an increase in the cost of milk to make
cheese. 
The cheese plant sees that April BFP contracts are trading at $12.00.  The basis has  been
$1.25.  The estimated procurement cost of milk for April is $13.25 ($12.00 BFP + $1.25 premiums).
The plant has an operating margin of $1.30.  Thus, the total cost to make cheese per hundredweight
of milk is estimated at $14.55.  With a yield of 10 pounds of cheese per hundredweight of milk, the
cheese plant contracts in January to deliver 50,000 pounds of cheddar cheese to a cheese buyer during
April at a fixed price of $1.455 per pound.  The cheese plant protects its $1.30 plant margin by buying
5 April BFP contracts at $12.00. 
In Case I, the April cost of milk increases from the estimated cost of $13.25 to $14.25,
reducing the plant margin by $1.00 to just $0.30.  But, the April BFP settles at the $13.00 announced
April BFP and a $1.00 gain on the futures market is realized.  Adding this $1.00 gain to $0.30 nets the
$1.30 plant margin desired.  In Case II, the cost of April milk is $1.00 lower than what was estimated,
but the realized plant margin is still just $1.30 because the $1.00 lower milk cost is offset by a $1.00
loss on the futures. 20
Without the ability to protect plant margins a cheese plant would be exposed to major financial
risk by entering into a fixed price contract for future delivery of cheese.  In this example, only a $0.30
realized plant margin could pose real financial problems for the cheese plant.  But  by  hedging the
cost of milk through the use of the BFP contracts, the $1.30 plant margin objective is protected.
  
Cheese Plant Contracts To Supply Cheese To A Buyer At A Specified Price
   Date            Cash Market    Futures Market Basis
Jan. 97 Cheese plant commits to providing 50,000 Buys 5 Apr. BFP $1.25
pounds of cheese during April 1997 at a contracts @ $12.00
fixed price of $1.455 per pound based on a
milk cost of $13.25 ($12.00 BFP + $1.25
premiums) and a plant margin of $1.30 per
hundredweight of milk.
Case I: Futures price increases/No basis change
Apr. 97 Cheese plant procures milk at $14.25 Apr. BFP announced @ $1.25
Gain/(loss) ($1.00) $1.00
Net Gain $0.00
($13.00 BFP + $1.25 premiums) and $13.00. Cash settles at
makes and delivers cheese to buyer at announced BFP price
$1.455 per pound
Case II: Futures price decreases/No basis change
Apr. 97 Cheese plant procures milk at $12.75 Apr. BFP announced @ $1.25
Gain/(loss) $0.50 ($0.50)
Net Gain $0.00
($11.50 BFP + $1.25 premiums) and $11.50.  Cash settles at
makes and delivers cheese to buyer at announced price
$1.455 per poundFurther information on the CSCE BFP contract is available by writing the Exchange at 4 World Trade
9
Center, New York, NY  10048, or call toll-free 1-800-HEDGE IT.  Information is also available on the Exchange’s




The BFP milk futures contract is a cash settlement contract.  Unlike the Grade A milk  and the
cheddar cheese futures contracts, no milk or cheese is ever delivered on the futures market.  Rather,
contracts outstanding at expiration are settled by payment and receipts representing the difference
between the contract and the reported BFP value.  This BFP cash settlement contract may be preferred
by some buyers and sellers to either the Grade A milk contract or the cheddar cheese contract.  Dairy
producers, for one, do not make cheese for delivery and it is difficult for them to deliver raw Grade
A milk under the futures market delivery requirements.  Fluid milk bottlers do not have cheese to
deliver.  But besides the delivery issue, because the BFP contract settles at the announced BFP it may
be superior to the Grade A milk futures contract.  There has been some difficulty in determining
exactly what the Grade A milk futures is reflecting, the BFP,  a Grade A price for milk used for
manufacturing or the value of spot shipments of Grade A milk from Wisconsin.  This has made it
difficult to determine the appropriate basis to use in hedging strategies. 
Since the BFP futures contract is settled at the announced BFP, it will be reflecting the BFP.
Basis determination should be improved over that of the Grade A milk futures.  Therefore, this new
BFP contract offers excellent hedging opportunities for buyers and sellers of raw milk whether they
are dairy producers, cheese manufacturers, or bottlers of package milk.  Since federal milk marketing
order pricing formulas directly incorporate the BFP, cash market participants can accurately relate
their prices to the BFP contract price.  Minimal basis risk should encourage broad hedging interest in
the new contract. 